We investigate the representation of game-theoretic measures of network centrality using a framework that blends a social network representation with the succint formalism of cooperative skill games. We discuss the expressiveness of the new framework and highlight some of its advantages, including a fixed-parameter tractability result for computing centrality measures under such representations. As an application we introduce new network centrality measures that capture the extent to which neighbors of a certain node can help it complete relevant tasks.
Introduction
Measures of network centrality have a long and rich history in the social sciences [1] and Artificial Intelligence. Such measures have proved useful for a variety of tasks, such as identifying spreading nodes [2] and gatekeepers for information dissemination [3] , advertising in multiagent markets [4] , finding important nodes in terrorist networks [5, 6] . Recent work has demonstrated that the use of coalitional game-theoretic versions of centrality measures is especially beneficial [7, 8] , and has motivated the study of other topics, such as the extension of centrality measures to more realistic settings [9] , or the study of (frontiers of) tractability of such measures [10, 11, 12] .
The starting point of this paper is the observation that, while motivations for studying many social network concepts (centrality measures in particular) are often stated informally in terms of capabilities that nodes may possess, capabilities that could help in performing certain actions, the actual definitions of such measures do not usually make explicit the different capabilities agent have for acting.
To give just a famous example: Granovetter's celebrated paper on the strength of weak ties [13] considers edges adjacent to a given node by their frequency of interaction. It argues that so-called weak ties (i.e. to those agents only interacting with the given node occasionally) are especially important. Such nodes may be capable to tell v about a certain job j, that v itself does not know about. The bolded statement may be seen, of course, as specifying a task tell [j] , that weak tie neighbors of v may be able to complete as a consequence of their network position.
The purpose of this paper is to study representational frameworks for network centrality that explicitly take into account the acting capabilities of various nodes. We follow [14] in advocating the study of network centrality measures from a coalitional game-theoretic perspective. Our concerns are somewhat different: whereas [14] mostly investigated representations of centrality measures from an axiomatic perspective, we study the use of succint coalitional representation frameworks [15, 16, 17, 18, 19] for such representations. The precise framework we investigate blends a network-based specification G = (V, E) of the agent system and the so-called coalitional skill games [19] , that informally endow agents with skills that may prove instrumental in completing certain tasks, and get profit from completing them. A centrality measure arises as an indicator (often the Shapley value) of the "importance" of the agent in the associated coalitional game, measuring the extent to which the agent helps coalitions profit from completing tasks.
The following is an outline of the (main results of the) paper: we prove (Theorem 1) that our representations are universal: all centrality measures have an equivalent CSG representation. We then identify some limits of this result by identifying a natural property (rationality) that subsumes CSG representations with constant coefficients but not the natural eigenvector centrality measure (Theorem 5). Next we highlight a benefit of CSG representations, in the form of a fixed parameter tractability result (Theorem 6). Also as an application of our framework, we define two new centrality measures which aim to measure the extent to which an agent can enlist its neighbors to help it complete a set of tasks. These measures extend some important concepts such as the original game-theoretic network centrality [2] . We show that our helping measures have tractable explicit formulas for some special CSGs. We then study (with limited success) the problem of axiomatic characterizations of helping centralities. The paper concludes with brief discussions and open problems.
For sketches of the missing proofs we refer the reader to the Supplemental Material.
Preliminaries and Notations
We will use (and review below) notions from several areas: Theory of multisets. A multiset is a generalization of a set in which each element appears with a non-negative multiplicity. The union of two multisets A, B, also denoted A ∪ B, contains those elements that appear in A, B, or both. The multiplicity of such an element in A ∪ B is the sum of multiplicities of the element into A, B. Given multisets A, B, we write A ⊂ B iff every element with positive multiplicity in A has at least as high a multiplicity in B. Coalitional game theory. We assume familiarity with the basics of Coalitional Game Theory (see [20] for a recent readable introduction). For concreteness we review some definitions:
A coalitional game is specified by a pair Γ = (N, v) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of players, and v is a function v : 2 N → R, called characteristic function, which satisfies v(∅) = 0. We will often specify a game by the characteristic function only (since N is implicitly assumed in its definition). Also, denote by Γ(N ) the set of all coalitional games on N . Given integer 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we denote by C k (Γ) the set of coalitions of Γ (i.e. subsets of N ) having cardinality exactly k, and let C(Γ) be the union of all sets C k (Γ). A game is monotonically increasing if v is monotonically increasing with respect to inclusion.
We can represent any game on set N as a linear combination of veto games:
Indeed, it is well-known [21] (and easy to prove) that the set of veto games (v S ) forms a basis for the linear space of coalitional games on N . Coefficients a S in the decomposition v = S a S v S are called Harsanyi's dividends. We will use solution concepts associated to coalitional games, notably the Shapley value. This index tallies the fraction of the value v(N ) of the grand coalition that a given player x ∈ N could fairly request. It has the formula [20] 
We also need to review several particular classes of coalitional games. A (weighted) dummy game is a triple Γ = (N, w, v) where w : N → [0, ∞) is a weight function and the characteristic function has the form v(S) = i∈S w(i).
A cooperative skill game (CSG) [19, 22] is a 4-tuple Γ = (N, Sk, T, v), where N is a set of players, Sk is a set of skills, T is a set of tasks, and v is a characteristic function. We assume that each player x ∈ N is endowed with a set of skills Sk x ⊆ Sk. We extend this notation from players to coalitions by denoting, for every S ⊂ N , Sk S := ∪ x∈S Sk x . On the other hand, each task t ∈ T is identified with a set of skills T t ⊆ Sk, the set of skills needed to complete task T t . Finally, each task T t has a profit w t ≥ 0. The value of a coalition S ⊂ N is defined as v(S) = t∈T :Tt⊆Sk S w t . In other words: the value of a coalition S is the sum of profits of all tasks that require only skills possessed by members of S.
We will actually slightly extend the framework from [19, 22] by requiring that tasks are multisets (rather than sets) of skills. Skillsets are still required to be ordinary sets, but the condition T t ⊆ Sk S is now considered as a multiset inclusion. A justification for this extension is given by the following example: Example 1. We build upon a scenario from [6] based on the 9/11 terrorist network initially reconstructed in [23] . In addition to ordinary nodes (displayed as white circles), some nodes are endowed with one of two skills: M ("martial arts", displayed as yellow squares), P ("pilot", displayed as grey diamonds) (see Figure 1 (a)). A coalition of nodes could execute a hijacking attack iff it contains at least two agents with capability M and one agent with capability P . This description maps easily onto an (extended) CSG with a single task, specified as the multiset of skills {M, M, P }, with profit 1, i.e. a coalition is winning iff it contains at least two M members and at least one P member. 1 We will denote by P (s) the set of players having a certain skill s. Semivalues [27] generalize the well-known concepts of Shapley and Banzhaf index. Given coalitional game Γ and C ∈ C(Γ), denote by M C(C, i) : we obtain the Banzhaf index. Another important case is the trivial semivalue β triv (0) = 1, β triv (i) = 0 otherwise. Finally, family of semivalues β = (β n ) is called polynomial time computable if the two-argument function (n, k) → (β n ) k has this complexity.
We note the following very simple result:
is a weighted dummy game and β is a semivalue then for every i ∈ N , φ i (v) = w(i).
Graph Theory and Network Centralities. A graph is a pair G = (V, E) with V a set of vertices and E a set of edges. The degree of v, deg(v) is the number of nodes v is connected to by edges. We will use ∆ to denote the maximum degree of a node in V . If v ∈ V is a vertex we will denote by N (v) the set of neighbors of v in G and byN (v) = N (v) ∪ {v}. We extend these definitions to sets S ⊆ V by N (S) = {z | ∃w ∈ S, (z, w) ∈ E}. We will denote by G V the set of all graphs on the vertex set V . A centrality index is a function, c : G V → R V that assigns to every node v ∈ V a real number, called the centrality of v quantifying the importance of node v in G. We will denote by C V the set of all centrality measures on the set V . We will usually drop V from our notation and write G, C, . . . instead of G V , C V and so forth. Figure 1 : The 9/11 WTC attack social nework (after [23] , with skills assigned by [6] ).
We will use several concrete measures of centrality. The following is a listing of some of them:
-betweenness centrality of node v in graph G is defined as follows: given two distinct nodes z 1 , z 2 ∈ V , denote by p(z 1 , z 2 ) the number of shortest paths in G between z 1 and z 2 , and by p(z 1 , z 2 , v) the number of shortest paths passing through v. Now we can define betweenness centrality as c close (v, G) = z1 =z2∈V p(z1,z2,v) p(z1,z2) .
-game-theoretic network centrality of node x in graph G is defined as the Shapley value of x in game Γ with characteristic function v * (S) = |S ∪ N (S)|.
-the eigenvector centrality of node v in graph G is defined as the v'th component of the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of G.
Coalitional Network Centralities. Following [14] , a representation function is a function ψ mapping every graph G = (V, E) onto a cooperative game Γ G whose players are the vertices of G, Γ G = (V, v G ). We will call a representation w skill-based if for every graph G, the associated game Γ G is a CSG. A coalitional centrality measure is a pair (ψ, φ), where ψ is a representing function and φ is a solution concept. A skill-based centrality measure is one for which representation ψ is skill-based. Given semivalue β, a β-skill-based centrality measure is a pair (ψ, φ) where ψ is a skill-based and φ is the semivalue induced by β. A skill-based centrality measure is trivial iff the solution concept φ is simply the value function of the CSG associated to graph G by φ. Note that for weighted dummy games this is equivalent to requiring that φ is the semivalue induced by the trivial semivalue β triv . 3 Universality of Skill-Based Centralities. [14] have shown that any centrality measure is equivalent to a coalitional centrality measure. We make this result slightly more precise: the cooperative game can be taken to be a CSG and the solution concept can be induced by any arbitrary semivalue:
Theorem 1. For every semivalue β and every centrality c ∈ C there exists an equivalent β-skill-based representation.
Proof. Let c ∈ C be a centrality measure on graph G. Consider the dummy game in which v(S) = v∈S c(v).
One can represent this dummy game by associating to G the CSG game Γ as follows: Sk = V , (i.e. skills correspond to agents). For every v ∈ V we define w(v) = c(v). Finally T = V . This yields a skill-based representation ψ C . Completing this representation by the trivial semivalue induced by β in Γ yields a β-skill-based centrality measure which (by Lemma 1) is easily seen to be equivalent to c.
Example 2. [Degree centrality:]
Consider a graph G = (V, E). We associate to G a game Γ as follows: skills correspond to edges of G. A node of G has a skill e iff it is incident with e. Tasks correspond to edges as well.
Sometimes, as the following example shows, the "natural" representation of centralities using CSG is inefficient, as the number of tasks may be exponential in the size of graph G.
Example 3. [Betweenness centrality]:
Consider a graph G = (V, E). Associate to G a game Γ as follows: skills correspond to edges of G. A node of G has a skill e iff it is incident with the corresponding edge. Tasks correspond to shortest paths connecting two nodes, say z 1 , z 2 in G. Such a task has weight equal to the inverse of the number of shortest paths between z 1 , z 2 . The trivial skill-based centrality measure coincides with (ordinary) betweenness centrality.
Limitations of (Rational) Network Centralities.
In Theorem 1 we were, in some sense, "cheating", as the values of network centrality were built in the weights the dummy game representing the measure.
In particular this game depended on the graph G, not only on n, the number of vertices. It is natural to ask whether universality fails once we impose some further restrictions on the framework that precludes such "pathological" representations.
In the sequel we study an interesting and natural restriction on characteristic functions and centrality measures: that they are "rational functions of the graph topology", i.e. a quotient of two polynomials. We formalize this idea as follows: Given a set of vertices V , denote by E n (V ) the set of subsets w = {v 1 , v 2 } of distinct vertices in V . Associate to every w ∈ E n (V ) a boolean variable X w . We can interpret the set E of edges of any graph G on V as a 0/1 assignment
. We do similarly for vertices, identifying a vertex i with a boolean variable Y v . This way we can specify a set of vertices S by a boolean vector, corresponding to those vertices v with Y v = 1.
To see that this equality is true: each i ∈ S contributes 1 to the first sum. Only i ∈ S may contribute to the second sum, but only when some term 1−Y i X i,j is equal to zero, that is when there is some j = i with Y j = 1 (i.e. j ∈ S) and
Example 6. Degree centrality is rational. Indeed, one may take P n,v [X] = e v X e and Q n [X] = 1.
The case of betweenness centrality is more interesting:
Betweenness centrality is rational.
Proof. For every set of vertices V , define D to be the family of simple paths in the complete graph on V . Given P ∈ D, define monomials
With these notations, we claim that we have the following formula
To prove equation (4) we first show that
Proof.X P = 1 iff X P = 1 and for all Q ∈ D, |Q| < |P |, X Q = 0, that is Q is not a path in G.
Applying Claim 1 we infer that P n,v,z1,z2 count shortest paths between z 1 , z 2 passing through v and Q z1,z2 counts all shortest paths between z 1 , z 2 .
The following two theorems show that the family of rational centrality measures is reasonably comprehensive: Theorem 3. Every centrality measure induced by a rational family of characteristic functions is rational.
Proof. From the marginal contribution formula for the Shapley value. Corollary 1. Game-theoretic network centrality [28] is a rational centrality measure.
Corollary 2.
If v n is a family of characteristic functions whose Harsanyi dividends are rational numbers then the family of centrality measures induced by v n is rational.
Proof. From Exp. 4 and the fact that linear combinations of rational functions with coefficients in Q are rational. It would be interesting to define an extension of the family of rational centralities that captures all "natural" centralities.
Since computing the Shapley value of CSG is #P -complete [29] , it follows that computing skill-based centralities is intractable in general. On the other hand, by imposing a natural restriction on the family of CSG games under consideration, that of an existence of an upper bound on the largest set of skills needed for a task, we get a fixed-parameter tractable class of algorithms: 
parameterized by k, the cardinality of the largest skill set required by any task, is fixed parameter tractable.
An Application: Helping Centralities.
In this section we give an application of the idea of representing network centralities by CSG. [30] have recently defined (using different ideas) a centrality measure that quantifies the extent to which a given agent adds value to a group. On the other hand, an agent may be valuable to a group even when it lacks the skills to contribute to completing a given task, provided it is capable to enlist neighbors with such skills.
Example 7. Members of the program committee for computer science conferences often use subreviewers to referee papers. Each paper needs to receive a minimal number (say three) of reviews. A PC member may lack the skill to competently review the paper itself. But the ability it may have to help the reviewing process by enlisting subreviewers with the required reviewing skills, in order to complete the task of getting three reviews for the given paper, is highly valuable.
Example 8. Consider again the coalitional game-theoretic framework for the WTC 9/11 terrorist network in Example 1. Nodes 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16 could have assembled an attacking team consisting of (some of ) their neighbors. In the case of node 16 (N. Alhazmi) this happens despite not being known to have had any of the two required skills P, M . Because of this fact, node 16 intuitively can "help" all non-winning coalitions (which may already include it !) by enlisting its neighbors. This is intuitively, not true for nodes 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13 : they do not "help" those coalitions that were already turned into winning coalitions by their mere joining. Neither do any other nodes in the network. So, intuitively, node 16 should be the "most helping" node.
It turns out that properly defining such a centrality notion is somewhat subtle and may not have a single, always best solution. The following could be the natural first idea: 
where n s is the number of players having skill s and k s,t is the number of copies of skill s needed to accomplish task t.
Note that ∆ * = ∆ in games where n s = k s,t for every task t ∈ T and s ∈ T t , in particular for games where each skill is possessed by a single player. 
This definition is sensible in at least the following three settings (Theorem 10, stated later, offers yet another one): In the next two examples each skill is unique to some player:
Example 10. Let G = S n be the star graph with n vertices (Figure 2 
n(n−1) for i = 2, . . . n. In conclusion HC(1) = 1, HC(i) = 0, for i = 2, . . . n. Node 1 is the only one that has positive helping centrality, despite being a null player ! Also, sensibly, the helping centrality of all other nodes is zero, as their only neighbor is 1 which is not in the coalition S, so they cannot help. 
The helping centrality of player x is defined as
Note that if game Γ is monotonically increasing then v(S x π ∪ {x} ∪ N (x)) − v(S x π ∪ {x}) ≥ 0. When the sign is strictly positive say that x helps ordered coalition S x π . Finally, by performing appropriate divisions we also consider the normalized versions HSh and Help. Doing this requires computing the probability that a random set of vertices is a vertex cover, which seems infeasible. This shows another problem of the Shapley-based helping centrality.
Helping Centralities in Terrorist
NetworksSome details on the (simple) computations substantiating our claims in this section are given as Supplemental Material.
We next apply our helping centrality measures to the terrorist network in Figure 1 . We could estimate helping centralities using sampling techniques similar to those for the Shapley value, but in this case of the 9/11 network exact computations are actually feasible. To reduce overhead, call two nodes equivalent iff (a). They have the same set of skills (b). The families of multisets of skills of their neighbors are identical as multisets. For Figure 1 this relation 16 as the most helpful, with comparable centralities, and give quite similar orderings (an interesting fact, since the two measures were fairly different). The ordering produced by Help seems slightly more discriminating.
Complexity of Helping Centralities.
As expected, computing helping centralities for arbitrary CSG is computationally intractable: 
A Tractable Special Case: Pure Skill Games
In the sequel we highlight a special class of CSG for which computing helping centralities is tractable.
Definition 7.
A pure skill game is a CSG where, for every t ∈ T , |T t | = 1 (every task presumes a single skill).
Theorem 10. For pure skill games v and player x ∈ V
We have denoted by P (t) the set of players that have the unique skill needed to complete task t. Consequently, both quantities Help(x) and HC(x) are ≥ 0 for all players x.
7 Axioms for Helping Centralities.
The Shapley value has a nice axiomatic characterization [31] . The axiomatic approach to characterizing various coalitional measures has developed into an important direction in coalitional game theory, and has recently been adapted to centrality measures as well. A natural question is whether our Helping Shapley value has a similar axiomatic characterization.
To attempt such a characterization we define a number of properties reminiscent of the axiomatic characterization of the ordinary Shapley value: veto game symmetry if for any veto game v S and players x, y ,
Theorem 11. The Helping Shapley value satisfies the linearity and null helping axioms.
Unfortunately while the Shapley value satisfies veto game symmetry, this is not true for the Helping Shapley value:
Example 13. Consider the star network S n in figure 2 (b) . Then in the unanimity game v N on S n (corresponding to S = {1, 2, . . . , n}) we have HSh[v S ](1) = 1 > 0, HSh[v S ](i) = 1 n−1 > 0 for all i = 2, . . . , n. Indeed, node i ≥ 2 is pivotal for π iff all other nodes in S \ {1, i} appear before i in π. This happens with probability 1/(n − 1). This mismatch has implications for the axiomatic characterization of the Helping Shapley value: for the ordinary Shapley value its uniqueness amounts to establishing veto game symmetry, which normally follows from an equal treatment axiom. The lack of veto symmetry means that we cannot adapt the classical proof of the Uniqueness of the Shapley value to the Helping Shapley value, but we only have the following weaker version: 
Related work 2
Our work combines several important lines of research: the extensive literature on (game-theoretic) centrality measures (see [1, 8] for reviews from different perspectives) and that on compact representation frameworks for cooperative games [15, 16, 17, 18, 19] . Through our Theorem 12 we connect to the growing literature on the axiomatic characterization of values and centrality measures (for a recent example see [14] ).
Ideas related to the use of compact representations in defining notions of network centrality have been considered (implicitly or explicitly) in previous literature, e.g. [12, 14] . This last paper is, perhaps, the closest in spirit to our approach. They undertake a comprehensive study of classes of network centralities and identify axiomatic foundations for various representational frameworks. Compared to this work our focus is, however, different: we strive to include capabilities/tasks explicitly into the representational framework, and identify one framework which does just that.
Finally, a related problem (but with different technical concerns) is team formation in the knowledge discovery literature [32, 33] . 9 Conclusions, Further Work, Open Problems.
Our work provides two important conceptual contributions: (1) . Giving an explicit framework for representing capabilities to perform tasks in measures of network centrality, and (2) . Proposing the new notion(s) of helping centrality. We have given two such measures, which perform similarly on the 9/11 network. Helping Centrality seems to be slightly more discriminating (and has sometimes exact formulas) but seems to lack "nice" axiomatizations.
Several open issues arise: first of all, we have only used one of the several formalisms for CSG games. A more extensive investigation of the representational power of (other) families would be in order. So would the computational and experimental aspects of helping centralities. The problem of defining representational formalisms that are able to naturally model all "reasonable" centrality measures is, we feel, an interesting one. Finally, note that Helping Centrality is missing from the list of #P -complete results of Theorem 9. We leave its complexity open.
Supplemental Material
In this manuscript we give some extra details on the proofs omitted from the main document:
10 Proof of Theorem 4
We will use the decomposition of coalitional skill games by linearity to reduce the problem to reasoning about simple skill games, i.e. CSG consisting of a single task t of unit profit. In this setting a coalition S is called winning if it can accomplish task t and losing otherwise. Define by W (t) the set of minimal winning coalitions for task t, i.e. of subsets A such that v(A) = 1 and v(B) = 0 for any strict subset B of A.
Then the polynomial 1 −
is equal to 1 precisely when for some A ∈ W (t) we have Y r = 1 for all r ∈ A.
11 Proof of Theorem 6
We will again use the decomposition of coalitional skill games by linearity to reduce the problem to reasoning about simple skill games. Clearly Φ β i can be computed by estimating, for k = 0, . . . , n − 1 quantities E C∈C k [M C(C, i)]. Nonzero marginal contributions arise from ordered coalitions C ∈ C k such that (1) . i is the last element of C.
(2). C is winning.
(3). C \ {i} is not winning.
For every task T j (identified with a multiset of skills) denote by T * j the set of submultisets of T j . For T ∈ T * j and 1 ≤ r ≤ n − 1 denote by n i T,r the number of ordered coalitions X of size exactly r and not containing i such that S X ∩T j = T . Denote W i,j = C i ∩ T j the set of skills of agent i that can contribute towards completing task j. An ordered coalition satisfies properties (1)-(3) above if and
Tj \Wi,j ⊆T Tj (n − r − 1)! n! · n i T,r .
We use a dynamic programming approach to compute parameters n i T,r . The table has at most 2 k columns, each corresponding to a submultiset of T j . Rows of the table correspond to pairs (r, s), where r ≤ s ≤ n. The element on row (r, s) and T , denoted by n i T,r,s , counts ordered coalitions X of size r not containing element i, formed with elements from a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a s , such that S X ∩ T j = T . Clearly n i T,r = n i T,r,n . We start the table by filling in rows (r, s) = (0, 0) and (r, s) = (1, 1). Clearly, n i T,0,k = 0 for all k ≥ 1 and T ⊆ T j , and n i T,1,1 equals the number of players k = i such that S k ∩ T j = T . Thus rows (0, 0) and (1, 1) can be completed by simple player inspection. Now, coalitions X of size r not containing element i with elements from the set a 1 , a 2 , . . . a s such that S X ∩ T j = T decompose into two types: It is easily seen that the complexity of the provided algorithm is O(2 k · poly(|Γ|)). Thus the problem is fixed parameter tractable.
Proof of Theorem 7
By additivity it is enough to assume that Γ is a single-task game.
We will investigate quantity
The average of this quantity over all permutations π ∈ S n yields HC(x). Further define, for A ⊆ V ,
Quantity in Equation (8) is, of course, nothing but h(S x π ∪ {x}) − h(S x π ), and . If x has no skill useful to the unique task t then Case 5 cannot happen (since condition v(A ∪ {x}) = 1, v(A) = 0 is impossible), and we are done.
In the opposite situation, suppose x has the useful skill s. To prove that HC(x) ≥ 0 it is enough to compare the contribution of positive terms (Cases 3,4 in the previous enumeration) with that of negative terms (Case 5). It turns out that we will only need to compare contributions from Cases 4 and 5.
In both cases 4 and 5, as v(S x π ∪ {x}) = 1, v(S x π ) = 0 and x adds one more skill to S x π , x must add precisely the unique copy of skill s that S x π is missing to complete task t.
Since v(S x π ∪{x}) = 1, v(S x π ) = 0, in both cases x must be the k s,t 'th element with skill s in π. The difference between Cases 4 and 5 is, therefore, whether v(S x π ∪ N (S x π ) = 1, that is whether some node in S x π is adjacent (or not) to a node with skill s in V \ S x π . Let's condition on (V \ (S x π ) ∩ P (s) being equal to a fixed set C (of size n s − k s + 1) and compare the contributions of permutations falling in Cases 4 and 5 to HC[x].
It is easy to see that v(S x π ∪ N (S x π )) = 1 iff some node in S x π is adjacent to some node in C, i.e. if S x π contains some node in N (C) \ C. In other words, we are in Case 4 iff C ∪ N (C) ⊆ V \ S x π , i.e. when x is the first element in {x} ∪ N (C) \ C. This happens with probability 1 |N (C)\C|+1 . The contribution of permutations π with S x π falling in Case 4 to the sum is
As for case 5, we are in that case with conditional probability |N (C)\C| |N (C)\C|+1 . The contribution of permutations π with S x π falling in Case 5 to the sum is −
The difference in contributions is
, which is ≥ 0 by the definition of ∆ * .
Proof of Theorem 8
By the linear decomposition of games as combination of veto games, we only need to compute the Helping Shapley value of i for the S-veto game v S . Clearly, if i ∈ S ∪N (S), then HSh[v S ](i) = 0. Indeed, in this case i can help no coalition T contain S, sinceN (i) ∩ S = ∅). So we concentrate on the case i ∈ S ∪ N (S). There are two subcases:
-i ∈ S. Then i is pivotal iff all elements of N C(i, S) appear before i in π.
The probability of this happening is 1 |N C(i,S)|+1 .
-i ∈ N (S) \ S. Then i is pivotal iff all elements of N C(i, S) appear before i in π and some element of S ∩ N (i) appears after i in π. That is (a). all elements of N C(i, S) apppear before i in π (an event which happens with probability 1/(|N C(i, S)| + 1)), but it is not the case that (b). i is the last element of S ∩ N (i) in π. Events (a), (b) are independent, since they refer to sets (N C(i, S), S ∩ N (i) that do not intersect), and the probability of (b) happening is 1/|Cov(i, S)|.
To derive the second formula we simply use the formula for the Shapley value.
Proof of Theorem 9
Since computing the Shapley value of an arbitrary CSG is #P -complete [29] 
Proof of Theorem 10
Decomposing again the game v into a weighted combination of single task games, we reduce the proof of the formulas to the setting when the game is a such a game. A coalition S satisfies v cen (S) = 1 iff v(S ∪ N (S)) = 1. We infer that x is pivotal to coalition S under v cen iff v(S ∪ {x} ∪ N (S ∪ {x}) = 1 , but v(S ∪ N (S)) = 0. Because the game is a pure skill game, these conditions are equivalent to requiring that x or some node in N (x) can perform task t, but nodes in S cannot. In other words x is the first node in permutation π from the set P (t) ∪ N (P (t)).
Given this argument, the first proof is simple: The probability that in a random permutation x is the first player among those in P (t) ∪ N (P (t)) is 1/|P (t) ∪ N (P (t))|. A similar computation works for computing the Shapley value of v, establishing the formula for HC[v](x). Note that, since |P (t) ∪ N (P (t))| ≤ (∆ + 1)|P (t)|, HC[v](x) ≥ 0.
As for the second proof, for x to be pivotal to HSh[v], none of the elements before x in π must be in T , while x must be in T ∪ N (T ). There are two cases: -x ∈ P (t), i.e. t ∈ T x . Then x must be the first element of P (t) in permutation π. In a random permutation this happens with probability 1/|P (t)|.
-x ∈ N (P (t)) \ P (t), i.e. t ∈ TN (x) \ T x . Then x must be the first element from {x} ∪ P (t) in permutation π. In a random permutation this happens with probability 1/(|P (t)| + 1).
The computation of the Shapley value is equally simple, and uses similar probabilistic arguments.
Proof of Theorem 11
A couple of straightforward verifications. 18 Helping Centralities in the 9/11 Terrorist Network: Some Details
We have implemented a simple Python script calcShapley.py for computing measures Help and HC (see the details on it in the next section). The (raw) results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. 19 Details on the Python script calcShapley.py
The input is read from a file and has the following structure: Following the input phase we construct a list "fact" to hold the factorials of numbers from 0 to 19. Afterwards we can proceed with the actual computation. The idea is to count how many coalition a certain node can help. We use backtracking to generate all unordered coalitions. If a coalition doesn't contain at least one pilot and two martial artists, we iterate through all 19 terrorists to see who could help this coalition achieve its goals. We perform three checks for all terrorists: does the coalition win if terrorist x joins it? Does it win if x joins with his neighbors? If the coalition with its neighbors doesn't win, does it win if x and his neighbors join? For the questions answered by yes, we count in the number of ordered coalitions helped in a certain way by x. To get the number of ordered coalitions from the unordered ones, we need to count all permutations that begin with the coalition in question, continue with terrorist x, and end with the rest of the terrorists that are not x and not in the coalition.
To get this number, we multiply the factorial of the size of the coalition with the factorial of the remaining terrorists. From these counts we can then compute the Shapley value and the HC and Help indices introduced in the paper. The function "iterate" recursively generates all combinations in a list "coalition", which contains 20 values of 0 or 1 representing for each terrorist whether he's in the coalition or not. In other words, if coalition[x] is 1, then x is in the current coalition. For each coalition and each terrorist x the check functions are called: checkshapley, checkhelp and checkvcen. These functions construct the coalition extended with x in the appropriate way according to the logic described above. The counts are held in the respective variables scoreshapley, scorehelp and scorevcen. Intuitively, the Shapley value for the game v is retrieved by dividing scoreshapley with the total number of coalitions (19!). The Shapley value in vcen is retrieved similarly by dividing scorevcen with 19!. Using these values we can compute the HC and Help indices described in the paper using their respective formulas. In the end, the print all function is called. We print the Shapley, HC and Help values for each terrorist. The last three printed lines contain for each value concept the sum of values of all terrorists, verifying that the Shapley and HC values sum up to 1, whereas Help does not.
